JAMES PEARCE
“If the ideal of true freedom is the maximum of power for all members of human society alike to make the best of themselves, we are right in refusing to ascribe the glory of freedom to a state in which the apparent elevation of the few is founded on the degradation of the many” T. H. Green, Lecture on Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract
Human Fulfillment & Wealth Inequality
According to a recent report published by Oxfam, the disparity between the wealthiest and the poorest in British society is growing at an alarming rate.
According to a recent report published by Oxfam, the disparity between the wealthiest and the poorest in British society is growing at an alarming rate. ‘A Tale of Two Britains’ (the report in question) shows that the country’s top 5 richest families are now wealthier than the poorest 20%; not a surprising statistic, I would imagine, for the vast majority of us.
Protests against such extreme wealth inequalities usually stem from debates on justice, equality and fairness, with much time being spent discussing the merits of ‘equality of opportunity’ or ‘equality of outcome’. Although these are, without a doubt, worthwhile debates to have, in this article I will argue that an equally important discussion is being overlooked; that of the negative effect of wealth disparity on the function of society as an ethical institution, and the harm this does to the fulfilment and development of the individual within this institution.
The idea of human fulfilment or the realisation of human capacities is a neglected one in modern life; the concept of perfectibility bringing to mind the characterless, uniformed societies of mid-20th century totalitarianism, and the word ‘fulfilment’ being written off as a platitude suitable only for magazine advice columns. We deny human perfectibility as illiberal and at odds with individual liberty, yet we accept it tacitly in every normative statement we make about human character.
Fulfilment, for the purposes of this article, is nothing more than being the best human being one can be. This does, however, assume an idea of universal humanness; this notion of humanness is worth a brief examination.
To hold that mankind is a social species does not strike me as a particularly bold or controversial position to take; the impossibility of our existence outside of society makes this clear. The individual is formed in her identity and moral sensibility by societal association; even the concept of individuality itself is reliant on society, offering the backdrop of the whole on which is projected the particular.
The degree of influence that association has on the individual may be open for discussion, but that association has a role in her moral formation is not in doubt. It is on the acceptance of these assumptions that this article’s central proposition is based: that the moral fulfilment of the individual is reliant on societal association and the common good.
“It is in fact only so far as we are members of a society, of which we can conceive the common good as our own, that the idea has any practical hold on us at all, and this very membership implies confinement in our individual realisation of the idea.” T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics
What, then, is the common good? How do we achieve fulfilment through the common good, and how do we ‘conceive the common good as our own’? The common good, as it is being used here, is a notion of purpose or principle common to all members of an institution or social body; it is not the suppression of difference, but merely the recognition of universal aims.
A basic example would be that of lecturers, students and administrators in a university, each approaching the institution of the university from their own particular angle, but all of them recognising a common purpose; that of education (in principle, anyway). In this regard we can see institutions as ‘ideas’, to use the language of Bernard Bosanquet, defined by the very commonality of the individual ideas involved. This principle applies just as much to an institution such as society as it does to a university or school.
In a time when the individual is deemed sacred, we sometimes forget that in order to reflect on our own character, we often need to look outside ourselves.
In society particularly, the recognition by individuals of such common purposes is important for three major reasons; firstly, such realisation of common purposes and aims makes the individual see herself as a particular part in the whole, an aspect of a greater moral picture; secondly, and following from the first, it develops a feeling of kinship and common humanity between individuals; and finally, through exposure to others’ aims, the individual comes to the realisation that a truly moral individual good cannot be one which harms others’ pursuit of their own notion of the good. In achieving this final point, the individual recognises what Green calls the ‘universal will to be good’; his own adaptation of the Kantian kingdom of ends. This acts as the foundation of the common good of society as a whole.
“The individual has his own nature communicated to him as he is summoned to fit himself for rendering a distinctive service to the common good. He becomes ‘something’; an incarnation of a factor in the social idea” Bernard Bosanquet, Philosophical Theory of the State
Where, one may ask, in this abstract (and almost criminally simplified) formulation does wealth inequality fit? Most readers will be no doubt aware of the polarisation of society caused by vast disparities in wealth. The marketization of certain aspects of public life have led to individuals, from a very young age, being segregated from their fellows on no grounds other than their (or their family’s)wealth.
Bernard Bosanquet
Take schooling as an example; in the upper reaches of the private education system, children are largely confined to sharing formative experiences with those of similar wealth and background. Not only does this channel certain individuals towards a particular identity and way of thinking, it prevents them almost entirely from experiencing anything in common with those of lesser means.
Here lies the first link between wealth inequality and fulfilment; the separation of society as a whole into sub-societies ensures that there are few, if any, effective common aims. Under such conditions, society ceases to function as an ‘idea’ and forms a barrier to individuals becoming truly fulfilled social beings.
The second link between wealth inequality and fulfilment lies in the domination of one sub-society by the other; the links between wealth and political power in the current political context systematise this domination. Society, in this case, becomes a power relationship, serving the common aims of one group over another. Theoretically, I argue, this is just as detrimental to the moral fulfilment of the wealthy as it is to the poor.
This alternative argument seeks not to replace the traditional arguments around fairness, but to add a new aspect to deliberations on wealth disparity within society. In a time when the individual is deemed sacred, we sometimes forget that in order to reflect on our own character, we often need to look outside ourselves.
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